Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach
Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach
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增强国际投资法的合法性：新公法途径的概念和方法基础
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2011
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通讯作者：
S. Schill
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作者：
S. Schill
离子。否则，比较分析就会迷失在特殊性中，而忽略了包括公法在内的许多法律秩序所共有的共同秩序原则在外国投资方面选择审查的法律制度的另一个方面，特别是在旨在确定是否存在一般法律原则时，涉及的问题是，是否主要考虑有关投资条约缔约方的国内法律秩序，还是进行更广泛的比较工作。投资条约的形式主要是双边条约，建议只考虑缔约各方的公法制度。146然而，与反映交换条件交易结果的真正双边条约不同，双边投资协定发展了多个重叠部分和结构上的相互联系，并为国际投资保护创造了一个相对统一的、涵盖条约的制度，在功能上基本上相当于一个多边体系有几个因素表明，国际投资条约不是双边条约，就两国之间交换条件的讨价还价而言，而是构成投资保护条约总体制度的一部分- -换句话说，这是一个多边性质的框架，尽管它采取了双边条约的形式。首先，国际投资条约通常符合一个原型。它们在措辞上趋同，并形成了一种惊人的统一。因此，这种潜在的概念上的统一也应反映在比较方法的范围内，即通过更普遍地利用公法概念，而不局限于管辖BIT的缔约各方的法律。145. 在这个意义上，正如della Cananea正确地指出的那样，“一般法律原则的概念不一定与对特殊性的承认相反。”della Cananea，上书138，第41页。146. Iran-U.S。例如，索赔法庭在制定一般原则时主要依靠美国和伊朗的法律秩序。参见Grant Hanessian，“伊朗-美国法律的一般原则”。索赔法庭，27栏。中国生物医学工程学报，2004 (2)；另见Michael Akehurst，《衡平法与一般法律原则》，《国际商法典》第25版，801,824-25(1976)（指出在确定一般原则时法律秩序的选择与双边主义/多边主义区分之间的联系）。147. 在国际投资保护原则方面尤其如此，这些原则在不同的双边条约中是相当统一的，例如禁止直接和间接的无偿征用、公平和平等待遇、充分保护和安全以及国民待遇。关于国际投资法虽然载于双边条约，但基本上构成一个多边法律制度的论点，一般见SCHILL，上面说明13，第15页。需要明确的是，这个论点并不是说双边投资协定等同于多边条约；其论点是，现有的投资条约，无论是双边的、区域的还是部门的，都可以被理解为支持构成全球经济一部分的国际投资空间的条约总体法律框架的一部分。论点也不是说有完全的统一，而是有足够的趋同，以便能够将国际投资法称为一个国际法学科，它由统一的投资法原则组成，通过相当统一的体制机制实施，并遵循相当统一的基本原理。《国际投资法的合法性》[j]特别是，大多数投资条约规定了同一套实质性投资者的权利。这种趋同也不是巧合。相反，双边投资协定的相似性源于将双边投资协定纳入多边框架的各种国际进程。因此，双边投资协定通常可以追溯到国家示范条约，而这些示范条约又具有共同的历史渊源：今天的大多数示范条约都受到了20世纪60年代资本输出国在经济合作与发展组织（OECD）内部建立多边投资条约的共同努力的启发。虽然存在其他的示范条约，但经合发组织的模式在资本输出国和资本输入国之间的条约谈判以及后来的南南双边投资协定谈判中都占主导地位双边投资协定趋同的原因可以说是，统一的规则原则上符合所有国家的利益，因为它们对于创造一个公平的竞争环境是必要的，使投资能够流向资本配置最有效的地方其次，双边投资协定通常包含最惠国待遇条款，要求各国平等对待投资者及其投资，不受国籍限制。151 .因此，最惠国待遇条款使特定双边投资协定的利益多边化，并使特定东道国对外国投资的保护协调一致。虽然关于最惠国条款是否包含更有利的投资者-国家争端解决准入要求以及在给予外国投资者的实质性标准之外更广泛的仲裁同意，仲裁法理中存在争议，152第三，投资者本身有充分的选择来规避独立于最惠国条款适用的特定投资条约中可能存在的限制。显然，最惠国条款在原则上平衡了东道国与第三国之间的国家间关系，推动了国际投资保护体系向多边主义的方向发展。153 .虽然双边投资协定的属人范围限于缔约另一方的国民，但投资者往往只需通过在第三国的子公司进行投资，就能使其投资处于更有利的条约的适用范围之内这种收购条约是可能的，因为双边投资协定通常会保护公司结构，而不受其背后股东国籍的影响。155年148年。条约采购的广泛选择削弱了
ion. Otherwise, a comparative analysis gets lost in particularities and overlooks the common ordering principles that many legal orders, including in public law, share.145 Another aspect concerning the choice of legal systems to examine in the foreign investment context, in particular when aiming at determining the existence of general principles of law, relates to the question of whether to look primarily at the domestic legal orders of the contracting parties to the investment treaty in question or whether to engage in a broader comparative exercise. The form of investment treaties as mostly bilateral treaties suggests looking only toward the public law systems of the contracting parties. 146 Unlike genuinely bilateral treaties that reflect the result of a quid pro quo bargain, however, BITs develop multiple overlaps and structural interconnections, and create a relatively uniform and treatyoverarching regime for international investment protection that is functionally largely equivalent to a multilateral system.147 There are several factors suggesting that international investment treaties are not bilateral treaties in the sense of quid pro quo bargains between two countries, but rather form part of a treaty-overarching system of investment protection — in other words, a framework that is multilateral in nature even though it has taken the form of bilateral treaties. First, international investment treaties generally conform to an archetype. They converge in their wording and have developed a surprisingly uniform This underlying conceptual uniformity, then, should also be reflected in the scope of the comparative method, namely by drawing on public law concepts more generally, without limitations to the law of the contracting parties to the governing BIT. 145. In this sense, as della Cananea rightly points out, “the idea of general principles of law is not necessarily in contrast with the recognition of particularities.” della Cananea, supra note 138, at 41. 146. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, for instance, has mainly relied on the legal orders of the United States and Iran when developing general principles. See Grant Hanessian, “General Principles of Law” in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 309, 318 (1989); see also Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 801, 824–25 (1976) (pointing out the connections between the choice of legal orders when determining general principles and the bilateralism/multilateralism distinction). 147. This particularly holds true as regards the principles of international investment protection that are rather uniform across different bilateral treaties, such as the prohibition of direct and indirect expropriation without compensation, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and national treatment. On the thesis that international investment law constitutes an essentially multilateral system of law even though it is enshrined in bilateral treaties, see generally SCHILL, supra note 13, at 15. To be clear, the argument is not that BITs are equivalent to a multilateral treaty; the argument is rather that the existing investment treaties, whether bilateral, regional, or sectoral, can be understood as part of a treaty-overarching legal framework that backs up an international investment space that forms part of the global economy. The argument is also not that there is complete uniformity, but that there is enough convergence in order to be able to speak of international investment law as one international law discipline, which is made up of uniform investment law principles, which is implemented through rather uniform institutional mechanisms, and which follows rather uniform rationales. 2011] INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW’S LEGITIMACY 95 structure, scope, and content.148 In particular, most investment treaties provide for the same set of substantive investors’ rights. This convergence is also not coincidental. Rather, the similarities of BITs result from various international processes embedding BITs within a multilateral framework. Thus, BITs can usually be traced back to national model treaties, which, in turn, share a common historic pedigree: Most of today’s model treaties are inspired by the concerted efforts of capital-exporting countries in the 1960s to establish a multilateral investment treaty within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Although alternative model treaties existed, the OECD model became predominant for both the negotiation of treaties between capital-exporting and capitalimporting countries and later the negotiation of South-South BITs.149 The reason for the convergence of BITs is arguably that uniform rules are in principle in the interest of all states, because they are necessary to create a level playing field that enables investments to flow to wherever capital is allocated most efficiently.150 Second, BITs regularly contain MFN clauses that require states to treat investors and their investments equally, independent of nationality. 151 MFN clauses therefore multilateralize benefits from a particular BIT and harmonize the protection of foreign investments in a specific host state. While there is controversy in arbitral jurisprudence as to whether MFN clauses encompass more favorable access requirements to investor-state dispute settlement and broader consent to arbitration beyond the substantive standards granted to foreign investors,152 Third, investors themselves have ample options to circumvent restrictions that may exist in a specific investment treaty independent of the application of MFN clauses. it is clear that MFN clauses, in principle, level the interstate relations between the host state and third states and push the system of international investment protection towards multilateralism. 153 Although BITs are limited ratione personae to nationals of the other contracting party, investors can often bring their investment under the scope of application of a more favorable treaty simply by channeling it through a subsidiary in a third state.154 Such treaty shopping is possible because BITs regularly protect corporate structures independently of the nationality of the shareholders behind them.155 148. See SCHILL, supra note The broad options for treaty shopping undermine the