Discriminability of Subjective Performance Measures and its Impact on Ratee Incentives
Discriminability of Subjective Performance Measures and its Impact on Ratee Incentives
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主观绩效衡量的可区分性及其对受评人激励的影响
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Myung‐In Kim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Ahn;Iny Hwang;Myung‐In Kim
以前的研究主要解决最优的合同设计问题，主要必须解决提供适当的激励代理。然而，有有限的经验评估代理人实际上如何应对他们提供的合同中的绩效评估计划。此外，先前的研究忽略了按业绩计薪背景下可能影响奖励规定效力的其他因素。本研究考虑两个绩效测量特征（可辨别性和主观性）对代理努力分配和绩效的影响。我们发现，（一）代理性能的改善是正相关的程度的可辨别性;（二）主观措施是劣于客观措施，因为缺乏可辨别性提供激励的代理;和（iii）劣于主观措施的动机是加剧的情况下，客观和主观措施之间的可辨别性差距是显着的。我们的研究结果表明，为了有主观措施有效地补充客观措施，会计行业必须制定完善的绩效衡量系统，定义和衡量主观表现有足够的辨别力。
Prior research primarily addresses optimal contract design issues that the principal must address to provide proper incentives to the agent. However, there has been limited empirical assessment of how agents actually respond to the performance evaluation schemes in the contracts offered them. Moreover, prior research overlooks factors other than those from the pay-for-performance context that may impact the effectiveness of incentive provisions. This study considers the effect of two performance measure characteristics (discriminability and subjectivity) on agent effort allocation and performance. We find that (i) agent performance improvement is positively associated with the degree of discriminability; (ii) subjective measures are inferior to objective measures in providing incentive to the agent because of the lack of discriminability; and (iii) the inferiority of subjective measures for purposes of motivation is exacerbated in circumstances where the discriminability gap between objective and subjective measures is significant. Our findings suggest that, in order to have subjective measures effectively complement objective measures, the accounting profession must develop sound performance measurement systems that define and measure subjective performance with sufficient discriminability.