The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences
The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences
复制标题
单峰偏好经济体中的可分离原则
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-006-0092-4
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Y. Chun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Y. Chun
我们调查的影响，“可分性原则”的一类问题分配一个无限可分的商品之间的一组代理商与单峰的偏好。可分性原则要求，对于两个人口相同但社会禀赋可能不同的问题，其中代理人的偏好可能会改变，如果有一个代理人的偏好相同且奖励给他们的总金额相同的子组，则奖励给子组中每个代理人的金额应该相同。首先，我们考察了可分性与其他公理之间的逻辑关系。事实证明，一致性意味着可分性。然后，我们提出的一致规则的可分性的基础上，也在其他公理的基础上的特征。
We investigate the implications of the “separability principle” for the class of problems allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. The separability principle requires that for two problems with the same population, but possibly different social endowments, in which the preferences of agents may change, if there is a subgroup of agents whose preferences are the same and the total amounts awarded to them are the same, then the amount awarded to each agent in the subgroup should be the same. First, we investigate the logical relations between separability and other axioms. As it turns out, consistency implies separability. Then, we present characterizations of the uniform rule on the basis of separability and also on the basis of other axioms.