FORCED DISTRIBUTION RATING SYSTEMS AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF WORKFORCE POTENTIAL: A BASELINE SIMULATION
FORCED DISTRIBUTION RATING SYSTEMS AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF WORKFORCE POTENTIAL: A BASELINE SIMULATION
复制标题
强制分配评级系统和劳动力潜力的提高：基线模拟
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
L. Aiman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Steven E. Scullen;P. Bergey;L. Aiman
通过模拟，我们调查的特点，强制分配评级系统（FDRS），这需要每年解雇一定比例的劳动力，可能会与评级的可靠性，选择的有效性，选择率，和自愿离职率，以提高平均劳动力的绩效潜力。结果表明，FDRS可能会导致劳动力潜力的显着改善，大部分的改善应该发生在头几年，改善在很大程度上是一个功能的工人被解雇的百分比和自愿离职的水平。更大的改善与更高的被解雇人数和更低的自愿离职率有关。捆绑FDRS与招聘和保留举措的影响也进行了调查。
Through simulation we investigate how characteristics of forced distribution rating systems (FDRS), which require firing a certain percentage of the workforce each year, might interact with ratings reliability, selection validity, selection ratio, and voluntary turnover to improve average workforce performance potential. Results suggest that a FDRS could lead to noticeable improvement in workforce potential, that most of the improvement should be expected to occur over the first several years, and that improvement is largely a function of the percentage of workers to be fired and the level of voluntary turnover. Greater improvement is associated with higher numbers being fired and lower levels of voluntary turnover. The effects of bundling FDRS with recruiting and retention initiatives are also investigated.