Managerial innovation incentives, management buyouts, and shareholders' intolerance of failure
Managerial innovation incentives, management buyouts, and shareholders' intolerance of failure
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.11.002
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发表时间：
2017-02
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Shinsuke Kamoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shinsuke Kamoto
研究表明，除了管理代理问题外，股东对失败的容忍度也会恶化上市公司的管理创新激励。此外，管理层收购提高了创新强度，即使经理们没有从与私募股权公司合作的收购中获得额外价值。这项研究对公司创新、公司治理和股利政策之间的相互关系提供了深入的见解。它提供了管理层收购与创新强度之间存在正相关关系的经验证据背后的理论基础。它对促进管理层收购的公司特征以及私募股权公司的回报和风险结构提供了经验启示。
This study demonstrates that, apart from managerial agency problem, shareholders' intolerance of failure also deteriorates managerial innovation incentives in public firms. Furthermore, management buyouts improve the innovation intensity, even if managers gain no excess value from the buyouts in collaboration with private equity firms. The study provides insights into the interrelation between firms' innovation, corporate governance, and dividend policy. It presents a rationale behind empirical evidence of a positive relationship between management buyouts and innovation intensity. It provides empirical implications on firms' characteristics that facilitate management buyouts and the return and risk structure of private equity firms.