Financial development and economic growth in transition economies A survey of the theoretical and empirical literature
Financial development and economic growth in transition economies A survey of the theoretical and empirical literature
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转型经济体的金融发展和经济增长理论和实证文献综述
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发表时间：
2001
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通讯作者：
R. D. Haas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. D. Haas
信息不对称和交易成本在解释金融中介机构和金融市场对经济增长的重要性的经济文献中发挥了核心作用。这种市场缺陷对中欧和东欧国家尤其重要，这些国家往往缺乏运转良好的市场和法律机构，经济不确定性很高。因此，银行与中小企业之间的信息不对称很大，正如这些企业面临的外部融资溢价一样。此外，在许多国家，银行部门仍处于私有化进程的中间，而与此同时，金融市场仅处于起步阶段。此外，缺乏足够的“游戏规则”反映在不正当的激励上，比如对（前）国有企业的软预算限制。当企业违约时，银行通常不倾向于对它们提起破产诉讼。在很大程度上，这是缺乏有效的破产法和缺乏抵押品的直接结果。当银行不能令人信服地承诺不为破产企业再融资时，企业管理者的道德风险行为就会发展。因此，金融中介机构的配置功能将被扭曲，因为金融资金将流向亏损的大型（国有）企业，而与此同时，中小企业将完全依赖其内部产生的资金来为投资提供资金。因此，中欧和东欧仍然有缺陷的机构设置以及（在某些方面）运作不良的金融体系可能会将金融资源分配给“错误的”企业，从而阻碍经济增长。
Asymmetric information and transaction costs play a central role in the economic literature explaining the importance of financial intermediaries and financial markets for economic growth. Such market imperfections are especially relevant for the countries in Central- and Eastern Europe (CEE), where well-functioning markets and legal institutions are often absent and economic uncertainty is high. As a result, information asymmetries between banks on the one hand and small and medium-sized firms on the other are large, just as the external financing premium these firms are faced with. Also, in many countries, the banking sector is still in the middle of a process of privatisation, while at the same time financial markets are only in their infancy. Furthermore, the lack of adequate "rules of the game" is reflected in perverse incentives such as soft budget constraints for (former) state-owned firms. When firms default, banks are often not inclined to institute bankruptcy proceedings against them. To a large extent, this is the direct result of a lack of effective bankruptcy laws and the absence of collateral. When banks cannot credibly commit not to refinance bankrupt firms, moral hazard behaviour by firm managers will develop. As a result, the allocative function of financial intermediaries will be distorted, as financial funds will flow to loss-making, large (state-owned) firms, while at the same time small and medium-sized firms will fully depend on their internally generated funds to finance investments. The still deficient institutional set-up, as well as the (in certain aspects) poorly functioning financial systems in CEE, may thus hinder economic growth by allocating financial resources to the "wrong" enterprises.