Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain

Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain
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伊诺克·鲍威尔与后殖民英国的形成

DOI:
10.1177/0306396814531711
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发表时间:
2014
期刊:
影响因子:
2.6
通讯作者:
Mike Higgs
Mike Higgs
中科院分区:
法学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Mike Higgs

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Although Scahill does not make the argument himself, what he has catalogued is a return to the covert action strategy the US pursued in the cold war of the 1970s and 1980s, following defeat in Vietnam. Ironically, the state terrorism the strategy engendered produced the networks of violence that culminated in the 9/11 attacks. Dirty Wars does not delve into this earlier history; its account of US intervention in Somalia, for example, begins in the 1990s and does not cover the US sponsorship of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in the previous decade that contributed to the subsequent collapse of the country. But the implication of the book is that the same cycle is once again in train. In an epilogue, we are reminded of Donald Rumsfeld’s famous question: ‘Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?’ Scahill’s key argument is that, through its own actions, the US is ‘helping to breed a new generation of enemies’ who grow in number faster than they can be eliminated from the kill lists. Such ‘blowback’ arguments have been common to critiques of the US military over the last decade but Scahill’s reporting provides a wealth of new material on the ways the war on terror produces the very enemies it is supposed to be countering. Scahill’s desire to document the human costs of Obama’s wars and allow their victims a voice stands out all the more in an age of ‘embedded’ war reporters and Washington insiders masquerading as journalists. Dirty Wars ought to be read by all those who voted for Obama in 2008 in the hope that the war on terror would be ended; and it will be an essential weapon in the ongoing battle to achieve that end.