Essays on Actions and Events.
Essays on Actions and Events.
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关于行动和事件的论文。
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0149.1981.tb01007.x
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发表时间：
1981
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. White
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. White
这本书收集了戴维森对心灵哲学和行动哲学的开创性贡献。它的主要论点是，我们用来使物理过程变得可理解的普通因果关系概念也应该用于描述和解释人类行为。在论文按主题组织的三个小节中的第一个小节中，戴维森使用因果关系对有原因的行为、意图的行为、意志的弱点和意志的自由进行了新颖的分析。第二部分为这些分析提供了形式化和本体论框架。重点探讨了动作句和因果语句的逻辑形式及其所属本体论。为了支持这种分析，戴维森敦促我们接受非循环的细节、事件以及人和其他物体的存在。最后一节采用事件本体论，为戴维森称之为“反常一元论”的精神/物质辩论提供了一个反还原论的答案。戴维森认为，无论我们如何描述事件，事件都会进入因果关系，但为了不同的解释目的，事件可以被归入相互不可约的描述。如果事件是由理性引起并合理化的，那么它就有资格被称为精神事件，但只有当我们把它们纳入不适于编入严格法律的考虑之下时，才能被这样描述。如果我们想要解释这些相同事件的物理发生，我们就放弃了这些被统称为“理性的构成理想”的考虑；在这种情况下，我们必须将它们描述为受到严格法律的约束。用心理物理规律翻译这两个习语的不可能性阻碍了它们之间的任何分析还原关系。如果没有因果关系，精神和物质就会因此瓦解，而因果关系通过一个共同的事件本体论在两个领域都起作用。牛津大学出版社牛津大学出版社是牛津大学的一个部门，它促进了牛津大学在研究、奖学金、在纪念Nancy Hirschberg I 2牛津纽约奥克兰曼谷布宜诺斯艾利斯开普敦钦奈达累斯萨拉姆德里香港伊斯坦布尔卡拉奇加尔各答吉隆坡马德里墨尔本墨西哥城孟买内罗毕<e:1>圣保罗上海台北东京多伦多牛津是牛津大学出版社在英国和其他一些国家的注册商标，由牛津大学出版社公司在美国出版。纽约©在此集合唐纳德·戴维森2001作者的精神权利已被断言数据库权利牛津大学出版社（制造商）首次出版1980年本版本首次出版2001年保留所有权利。未经牛津大学出版社事先书面许可，或法律明确允许，或根据与适当的版权组织同意的条款，不得以任何形式或以任何方式复制、存储在检索系统或传播本出版物的任何部分。关于上述范围以外的复制问题，请发送给牛津大学出版社版权部，地址如下。您不得以任何其他装订或封面分发本书，并且您必须对任何收购方施加同样的条件。大英图书馆出版数据编目美国国会图书馆出版数据编目可用ISBN 0-19-924626-2 （Hbk）。ISBN 0-19-924627-0（英文版）为纪念南希·赫施伯格意图与行动
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of nonrecurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti-reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels 'anomalous monism'. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the 'constitutive ideal of rationality', if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events. Essays on Actions and Events Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in In memory of Nancy Hirschberg I 2 Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © in this collection Donald Davidson 2001 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 1980 This edition first published 2001 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-924626-2 (Hbk.) ISBN 0-19-924627-0 (Pbk.) In memory of Nancy Hirschberg Intention and Action