THE RATIONAL NONPURCHASE OF LONG-TERM-CARE INSURANCE

THE RATIONAL NONPURCHASE OF LONG-TERM-CARE INSURANCE
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DOI:
10.1086/261673
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发表时间:
1990-02-01
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
PAULY, MV
PAULY, MV
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
PAULY, MV

文献摘要

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目前,只有一小部分非贫困人口购买私人保险,以支付长期护理(LTC)费用。研究通常将未能购买私人保险归因于潜在购买者对保险利益的“不了解”以及对医疗保险目前涵盖长期护理的误解。我探讨了其他原因未能购买覆盖面的消息灵通,预期效用最大化的风险厌恶的个人,LTC与死亡率大幅增加,并为家庭成员代表的替代来源的照顾。即使以精算公平的保费提供长期护理保险,也可能没有需求,因为保险的主要后果是提高一个人遗产的预期价值。
Only a tiny fraction of the nonpoor population currently purchases private insurance coverage against long-term-care (LTC) costs. Studies generally attribute the failure to purchase private coverage to "unawareness" by potential purchasers of the benefits of coverage and a misperception that Medicare currently covers long-term care. I explore alternative reasons for failure to purchase coverage by well-informed, expected utility-maximizing risk-averse individuals for whom LTC is associated with a large increase in mortality and for whom family members represent an alternative source of care. There may be no demand for LTC insurance even if it is made available at actuarially fair premiums because the main consequence of coverage is to enhance the expected value of one's estate.