Assessing power system state estimation accuracy with GPS-spoofed PMU Measurements
Assessing power system state estimation accuracy with GPS-spoofed PMU Measurements
复制标题
使用 GPS 欺骗的 PMU 测量来评估电力系统状态估计的准确性
DOI：
10.1109/isgt.2016.7781269
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Taha
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paresh Risbud;Nikolaos Gatsis;A. Taha
电网已经发展成为配备高速通信和先进传感器的网络。虽然这种演变是巨大的，但网络攻击的风险正在增加。在电网中，配备GPS接收器的相量测量单元（PMU）现在无处不在地安装在广泛的位置，同时提供实时的电网可见性。合作，有限数量的pmu可以启用状态估计（SE）例程。然而，PMU测量可以通过GPS欺骗攻击明显改变，从而导致对系统物理状态的误导性描述。在这里，我们评估了GPS时间同步攻击对网格SE例程的影响。关于攻击估计的统计信息与系统的实际状态相关。我们还研究了由上述攻击引入的估计偏差的界限。数值算例对所开发的方法进行了验证。
Power grids have evolved into cyber-networks equipped with high speed communications and advanced sensors. While this evolution has been monumental, the risk of cyber-attacks is growing. In grids, phasor measurement units (PMU)-equipped with GPS receivers-are now ubiquitously installed in widespread locations, while providing real time grid-visibility. Cooperatively, limited number of PMUs can enable state estimation (SE) routines. However, PMU measurements can be notably altered via a GPS spoofing attack and consequently causing a misleading depiction of the physical status of the system. Here, we evaluate the impact of a GPS time-synchronization attack on the grid's SE routines. Statistical information regarding the attacked estimates are derived with relevance to the actual state of the system. We also investigate bounds on the estimation bias introduced by the aforementioned attacks. Numerical examples are included to support the developed methods.