Doing and Allowing*
Doing and Allowing*
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做和允许*
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Scheffler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Scheffler
许多哲学家说，虽然有些后果主义者否认，人们有更大的责任，一般来说，他们做什么比他们只是允许或未能防止。毫无疑问，这类观念在日常道德思想中扮演着重要的角色。我说“这类的某种观念”，是因为对于如何最好地描述这一观念所依据的区别，存在着相当大的分歧。许多哲学家试图使这一思想更加精确，并提出了围绕不同但重叠的区别的替代表述。在已经讨论过的候选区别中，有做和允许之间的区别，做和不做之间的区别，做和让发生之间的区别，做和不做之间的区别，作为和不作为之间的区别，积极的代理和消极的代理之间的区别，一个人直接对另一个人做的事情和仅仅因为一个人做的事情而发生在那个人身上的事情之间的区别，等等。我将不试图在这篇文章中对这些不同的候选人的区别进行评判。我想展示的是，
Many philosophers have said, though some consequentialists have denied, that people have a greater responsibility, in general, for what they do than for what they merely allow or fail to prevent. There is little doubt that some idea of this sort has an important role to play in ordinary moral thought. I say “some idea of this sort” because there is considerable disagreement about how best to characterize the distinction on which the idea rests. Many philosophers have tried to make the idea more precise and have put forward alternative formulations that revolve around different but overlapping distinctions. Among the candidate distinctions that have been discussed are the distinctions between doing and allowing, between doing and failing to prevent, between doing and letting happen, between doing and not doing, between action and inaction, between acts and omissions, between positive agency and negative agency, between what one does to another person directly and what merely happens to that person as a result of what one does, and so on. I will not attempt in this article to adjudicate among these different candidate distinctions. What I will instead try to show is that,