Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility as a Collusive Device ∗
Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility as a Collusive Device ∗
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环境企业社会责任作为共谋手段*
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kosuke Hirose;Sang‐Ho Lee;Toshihiro Matsumura
我们建立了一个模型，在这个模型中，行业协会选择是否采用环境企业社会责任（ECSR），然后企业在市场上竞争。首先，我们将排放上限承诺视为ECSR。在数量竞争下，联合利润最大化的行业协会采用ECSR，因为它是一种合谋的手段，虽然ECSR不被采用，如果企业独立选择它。相反，在价格竞争下，个别企业自愿采用ECSR，但行业协会选择更高的ECSR水平。这些研究结果表明，行业协会有更强的动机，鼓励企业采用ECSR比每个公司单独工作。此外，ECSR可能会损害社会福利，因为它限制了竞争。接下来，我们考虑排放标准承诺（承诺每输出排放量），我们发现这是不太可能比排放上限承诺，限制竞争，是无害的消费者。JEL分类代码：M14、Q57、L13
We formulate a model in which an industry association chooses whether environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) is adopted and then firms compete in the market. First, we consider emission cap commitment as ECSR. Under quantity competition, ECSR is adopted by the joint-profit-maximizing industry association because it serves as a collusive device, although ECSR is not adopted if firms choose it independently. By contrast, under price competition, individual firms voluntarily adopt ECSR but the industry association chooses a higher level of ECSR. These findings together suggest that industry associations have a stronger incentive to encourage firms to adopt ECSR than each firm working alone. Furthermore, ECSR can harm social welfare because it restricts competition. Next, we consider emission standard commitment (commitment to per-output emissions) which we find is less likely than emission cap commitment to restrict competition and is not harmful for consumers. JEL classification codes: M14, Q57, L13
排放标准优于排放税吗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
Nakamura;K.;國崎稔・中村和之;Minoru Kunizaki andTsuyoshi Shinozaki
通讯作者：
Minoru Kunizaki andTsuyoshi Shinozaki