2007 Circumvention landscape report: methods, uses, and tools
2007 Circumvention landscape report: methods, uses, and tools
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2007 年规避情况报告：方法、用途和工具
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ethan Zuckerman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Palfrey;H. Roberts;Ethan Zuckerman
随着互联网在过去的15年中爆炸式增长，最近吸引了十亿用户，数十个国家政府试图通过出于多种原因来过滤对国家的内容来控制该网络。各种各样的不同项目开发了可以用来规避这种过滤的工具，使经过过滤的国家的人们可以访问其他过滤的内容。在本报告中，作者描述了过滤和规避的机制，并评估了十个项目，这些项目可以开发可用于规避过滤的工具。这些工具在2007年进行了评估 - 使用来自过滤国家内部的两项测试及其在实验室环境中的测试 - 用于其实用性，可用性，安全性，促进，可持续性和开放性。该报告于2007年完成，并向一组私人赞助商发布。该报告的许多发现现在已经过时了，但是我们现在像以前一样介绍它们，因为我们认为有关这些工具的报告的广泛结论仍然有效，因为我们希望其他研究人员将从访问访问权限中受益用于测试工具的方法。作者发现，所有工具都使用相同的代理和加密基本机制，但是它们在托管代理模型上有所不同。有些工具使用中央托管的代理，另一些工具使用托管的代理，而另一些工具则使用使用两者组合的重新路由方法。作者发现，通常，这些工具可以使用户访问通过过滤国家 /地区阻止的页面，但是工具的性能通常很差，并且许多工具具有重要的，未报告的安全性漏洞。报告中包括了有关工具的开发人员的响应。
As the Internet has exploded over the past fifteen years, recently reaching over a billion users, dozens of national governments have tried to control the network by filtering out content objectionable to the countries for any of a number of reasons. A large variety of different projects have developed tools that can be used to circumvent this filtering, allowing people in filtered countries access to otherwise filtered content. In this report, the authors describe the mechanisms of filtering and circumvention and evaluate ten projects that develop tools that can be used to circumvent filtering. These tools were evaluated in 2007 -- using both tests from within filtered countries and tests within a lab environment -- for their utility, usability, security, promotion, sustainability, and openness. The report was completed in 2007 and released to a group of private sponsors. Many of the findings of the report are now out of date, but we present them now, as is, because we think that the broad conclusions of the report about these tools remain valid and because we hope that other researchers will benefit from access to the methods used to test the tools. The authors find that all of the tools use the same basic mechanisms of proxying and encryption but that they differ in their models of hosting proxies. Some tools use proxies that are centrally hosted, others use proxies that are peer hosted, and others use re-routing methods that use a combination of the two. The authors find that, in general, the tools work in the sense that they allow users to access pages that are otherwise blocked by filtering countries but that performance of the tools is generally poor and that many tools have significant, unreported security vulnerabilities. Responses from developers of the tools in question are included in the report.