Malicious circuitry detection using transient power analysis for IC security
Malicious circuitry detection using transient power analysis for IC security
复制标题
使用瞬态功率分析检测恶意电路以确保 IC 安全
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Liwei Wang;Hai Xie;Hong
恶意修改不可信代工厂的集成电路（IC），被称为“硬件木马”，已成为一个严重的安全威胁。由于使用传统的测试策略很难检测到这种特洛伊木马电路的存在，因此边信道分析被认为是一种替代方法。本文提出了一种基于主成分分析的非破坏性侧信道方法，通过对瞬时功率特征进行表征和比较来实现硬件木马检测。使用基于FPGA的测试设置的大型设计，包括128位AES密码的硬件测量结果验证的方法。实验结果表明，该方法能够在较大的噪声和变化情况下发现较小（<1.1%面积）的木马。
Malicious modification of integrated circuits (ICs) in untrusted foundry, referred to as “Hardware Trojan”, has emerged as a serious security threat. Since it is extremely difficult to detect the presence of such Trojan circuits using conventional testing strategies, side-channel analysis has been considered as an alternative. In this paper, we proposed a non-destructive side-channel approach that characterizes and compares transient power signature using principle component analysis to achieve the hardware Trojan detection. The approach is validated with hardware measurement results using an FPGA-based test setup for large design including a 128-bit AES cipher. Experimental results show that this approach can discover small (<;1.1% area) Trojans under large noise and variations.