Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or problem-solving?

Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or problem-solving?
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欧盟谈判:讨价还价还是解决问题?

DOI:
10.1080/13501760010014902
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发表时间:
2000
影响因子:
4.2
通讯作者:
Christer Jönsson
Christer Jönsson
中科院分区:
管理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ole Elgström;Christer Jönsson

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欧盟谈判的特点是讨价还价和解决问题的方式并存。欧盟谈判的持久性阻碍了坚韧的讨价还价行为,强大的共识规范的普遍性也是如此。另一方面,有证据表明,非常对抗性的行为往往导致最低共同标准的解决办法。我们认为,在欧盟的决策过程中发现的谈判模式是上下文决定的。经验表明,欧盟的日常谈判在很大程度上是解决问题的活动。然而,在某些情况下,会发生冲突性的讨价还价。因此,这一模式因政治化程度和政策类型以及决策进程所处阶段而异。我们还认为,学习的过程导致了欧盟的谈判风格的变化:解决问题已经成为越来越制度化的欧盟机制内。
EU negotiations are characterized bythe coexistence of a bargaining and a problem-solving approach. The permanence of EU negotiations discourages tough bargaining behaviour, as does the prevalence of strong consensus norms. On the other hand, evidence exists of very confrontational behaviour that often leads to lowest common denominator solutions. We argue that the mode of negotiation to be found in the EU decision-making processes is contextually determined. Empirically it is demonstrated that day-to-day negotiations in the EU are to a large extent problem-solving exercises. Under certain circumstances, however, conflictual bargaining occurs. The pattern varies with, therefore, level of politicization and type of policy, and according to the stage in the decision-making process. We also suggest that processes of learning have resulted in changes in the EU's negotiation style: problem-solving has become increasingly institutionalized within the EU machinery.