Political Realism and Human Interests
Political Realism and Human Interests
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政治现实主义和人类利益
DOI：
10.2307/2600353
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发表时间：
1981
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Richard K. Ashley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Richard K. Ashley
虽然政治现实主义通常被理解为固定在某些基本概念上的或多或少的同质传统，但约翰·赫兹的挑衅性作品促使人们试图以一种揭示一些深刻的二律背反的方式来审视现实主义学术：一些内部紧张局势使现实主义学术至少潜在地成为一种不断发展的开放式“对话”。具体而言，尤尔根·哈贝马斯的知识构成的利益-实践，技术和解放-的类别被用来区分两个对立的方面的现实主义对话：实践现实主义和技术现实主义。实践实在论的指导思想是在传统语境中维持主体间理解的实践认知兴趣。其相应的探究和基础方法是解释学。技术实在论是在技术认知兴趣的指导下把握客观规律，从而扩大技术对客观实在的控制力。它的调查和基础的方法基本上是实证主义的。在这种背景下，赫兹对现实主义对话的贡献在于，他在现实主义者中独树一帜，他强烈致力于解放认知兴趣--一种对自我反思的兴趣，这种兴趣是人类“自我形成过程”中自主表达意志和意识的基础。从这个角度来解释，赫兹被认为采用了一种双面的话语策略，每一面都涉及现实主义的两个方面之一，即实践和技术。然而，尽管赫兹的观点在概念上很出色，但如果现实主义学者基本上是以控制的技术兴趣为导向的实证主义科学家，那么赫兹的论点就不太可能有说服力。从这个意义上说，赫兹的作品代表了对现实主义、其本质及其发展潜力的一种批判性的“测试”。
Although political realism is often understood as a more or less homogeneous tradition fixed on certain essential concepts, John Herz's provocative piece prompts an attempt to examine realist scholarship in a way that reveals some deep antinomies: some internal tensions that make realist scholarship, at least potentially, an evolving, open-ended “dialogue.” Specifically, Jurgen Habermas's categories of knowledge-constitutive interests—practical, technical, and emancipatory—are employed to distinguish two opposed aspects of the realist dialogue: practical realism and technical realism. Practical realism is guided by a practical cognitive interest in sustaining intersubjective understanding within the context of tradition. Its corresponding approach to inquiry and grounding is hermeneutic. Technical realism is guided by a technical cognitive interest in coming to grips with objective laws so as to expand powers of technical control over an objectified reality. Its approach to inquiry and grounding is essentially positivistic. Against this background, Herz's contribution to the realist dialogue is that, unique among realists, he brings a strong commitment to an emancipatory cognitive interest—an interest in self-reflection as the basis for the autonomous expression of will and consciousness in the human species' “self-formative process.” Interpreted in this light, Herz is seen to employ a two-sided discursive strategy, each side addressed to one of realism's two aspects, the practical and the technical. However, though brilliant in conception, Herz's argument is unlikely to be persuasive if realist scholars are at base positivist scientists oriented by a technical interest in control. In this sense, Herz's piece represents a critical “test” of realism, its essence, and its developmental potential.