A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework
A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework
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新李嘉图框架下的政府债务和赤字政治理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Meltzer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Cukierman;A. Meltzer
由于存在着不同的能力，因此也有不同的遗产，即使在新李嘉图的世界里，一些人的遗产也受到限制。这些个人通过发行债券投票支持对后代征税，从而增加他们目前的消费。这产生了一些资本挤出，降低了工资率，并提高了利率。因此，即使是不受约束的个人，也不再对政府债务的规模无动于衷。这篇论文推导出了当每一代人按照多数规则确定当期税收、社会保障福利和国家债务时，有利于增加债务和赤字的条件。版权所有1989年，美国经济协会。
In the presence of different abilities, and therefore different bequests, some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo-Ricardian world. Such individuals vote for taxes on future generations, through the issuance of bonds, thereby increasing their current consumption. This produces some crowding out of capital, reduces wage rates, and increases the interest rate. As a consequence, even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt. The paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes, social security benefits, and the national debt by majority rule. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.