The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis
The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis
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可确定性的不存在：或者，作为默认假设的绝对可确定性的世界
DOI：
10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00510.x
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Rives
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Gillett;B. Rives
一个电子显然具有+1.6 × 10-9库隆布的电荷，但它是否也具有带电的性质？哲学家们担心所谓的“可确定的”谓词，如“带电”，是否真的指的是可确定的属性，就像他们乐于说的确定谓词，如“具有+1.6 x 10-19库仑的电荷”，指的是确定的属性一样。限定物和可确定物之间的区别本身是相当新的，只能追溯到剑桥逻辑学家WE约翰逊在上个世纪初对它的定义。但是，尽管这种区分是新出现的，但在正在进行的哲学辩论中，这种区分并没有得到多少认可。或者至少直到最近。人们对实在论关于性质的立场重新产生了兴趣，并认为确定-确定关系可能是理解心理因果关系的关键，这把约翰逊的区分推到了前面。随着这种新的关注，也出现了新的“乐观”的立场，赞同存在的确定性的性质。大卫·阿姆斯特朗、埃文·费尔斯和悉尼·舒梅克等人都为这种乐观的解释辩护，这些解释采用可确定的谓词，如“被充电”，来指代可确定的属性。[2]在本文中，我们的目标是仔细评估乐观主义，并论证拒绝可确定属性存在的悲观主义观点实际上是适当的默认立场。
An electron clearly has the property of having a charge of+ 1.6 x 10-'9 coulombs, but does it also have the property of being charged? Philosophers have worried whether so-called'determinable'predicates, such as' is charged', actually refer to determinable properties in the way they are happy to say that determinate predicates, such as' has a charge of+ 1.6 x 10-19 coulombs', refer to determinate properties. The distinction between determinates and determinables is itself fairly new, dating only to its definition by the Cambridge logician WE Johnson early in the last century.'But despite its newly minted condition the distinction has found little currency in on-going philosophical debates. Or at least until recently. Renewed interest in realist positions about properties, and arguments that the determinable-determinate relation may hold the key to understand-ing mental causation, have thrust Johnson's distinction to the fore. With this new attention has also come new'optimistic'positions that endorse the existence of determinable properties. David Armstrong, Evan Fales, and Sydney Shoemaker, among others, have all defended such optimistic accounts that take determinable predicates, such as' is charged', to refer to determinable properties. 2 In this paper, our goal is to carefully assess optimism and to argue that a pessimistic view, which rejects the existence of determinable properties, is actually the appropriate default position.