Endogenous Choice of the Timing of Setting Incentive Parameters and the Strategic Contracts in a Managerial Mixed Duopoly with a Welfare-Based Delegation Contract and a Sales Delegation Contract
Endogenous Choice of the Timing of Setting Incentive Parameters and the Strategic Contracts in a Managerial Mixed Duopoly with a Welfare-Based Delegation Contract and a Sales Delegation Contract
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福利委托契约和销售委托契约管理混合双头垄断中激励参数设定时机和战略契约的内生选择
DOI：
10.1007/s10842-018-0291-6
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jin-Li Hu;Satoshi Honma;and Hsiao-Ping Hsieh;本間聡;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Kiyoshi Matsubara;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura
本研究探讨了这样一种博弈：设定具有福利最大化所有者的上市公司的基于福利的激励参数和私营公司的销售激励参数的时机，以及在具有基于福利的授权的管理混合双头垄断中的战略合同内容（Nakamura in Int Rev Econ Financ 35:262–277, 2015）和销售授权都是由其所有者内生决定的。我们展示了两种市场结构：（1）具有数量合同的公共（私人）公司所有者是激励参数确定的领导者（跟随者）的市场结构；（2）具有数量（价格）合同的公共（私人）公司所有者是激励参数确定的跟随者（领导者）的市场结构。市场结构达到均衡，社会福利达到最高（1）。因此，在福利授权和销售授权的管理混合双头垄断中，政府等相关部门没有必要对上市公司的福利激励参数和私营企业的销售激励参数的设定时机以及战略合同的内容由所有者自由决定进行规制。在另一种均衡市场结构（2）中，上市公司和私营公司所有者的收益都保持在相对较低的水平。最后，我们根据其数量的二次成本函数，确认了均衡市场结构结果的稳健性，以应对公共企业和私营企业的成本函数从恒定边际成本到边际成本递增的变化。
This study explores the game in which both the timing of setting the welfare-based incentive parameter of a public firm with a welfare-maximizing owner and the sales incentive parameter of a private firm and the contents of their strategic contracts in a managerial mixed duopoly with a welfare-based delegation à la (Nakamura in Int Rev Econ Financ 35:262–277, 2015) and a sales delegation are endogenously determined by their owners. We show two market structures: (1) the market structure in which the owner of the public (private) firm with a quantity contract is the leader (follower) in the determination of the incentive parameters and (2) the market structure in which the owner of the public (private) firm with a quantity (price) contract is the follower (leader) in the determination of the incentive parameters. The equilibrium market structures and highest social welfare are achieved in market structure (1). Therefore, in a managerial mixed duopoly with a welfare-based delegation and a sales delegation, it is not as necessary for the relevant authority including the government to regulate the free determination of both the timing of setting the welfare-based incentive parameter of the public firm and the sales incentive parameter of the private firm and the contents of their strategic contracts by their owners. The payoffs of the owners of both the public firm and the private firm stay relatively low in market structure (2), another equilibrium market structure. Finally, we confirm the robustness of the results on the equilibrium market structures against the change in the cost functions of both the public firm and the private firm from their constant marginal costs to their increasing marginal costs on the basis of the quadratic cost functions with their quantities.