Spatial models of delegation
Spatial models of delegation
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DOI：
10.1017/s0003055404001157
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发表时间：
2004-05-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Meirowitz, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bendor, J;Meirowitz, A
虽然存在大量关于授权的文献，但很少有模型超越了一组核心的规范假设。这种方法可能是合理的，因为它易于处理，但由于未能把握不同假设的重要性，也未能超越具体模型，我们对授权动机的理解受到了限制。因此，最近接受审查和测试的授权理由与授权的非正式研究提供的一些更合理的理由不同。我们发现，令人惊讶的是，在文献中很少有结果取决于风险厌恶，令人惊讶的是，许多人都忽略了，但同样规范，技术假设，即不确定性是固定的（相对于政策）。放松关于维度和函数形式的关键假设，提供了一个关于委托的更清晰的直觉，一个更接近经典处理的直觉。该理论使我们能够将不同的制度特征（承诺，专业化成本，监控，多个校长）委托的可观察属性。
Although a large literature on delegation exists, few models have pushed beyond a core set of canonical assumptions. This approach may be justified on grounds of tractability, but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation. Consequently, the justifications for delegation that have received recent scrutiny and testing differ from some of the more plausible justifications offered by informal studies of delegation. We show that surprisingly few results in the literature hinge on risk aversion, and surprisingly many turn on the ignored, though equally canonical, technological assumption that uncertainty is fixed (relative to policies). Relaxing the key assumptions about dimensionality and functional forms provides a clearer intuition about delegation-one that is closer to classical treatments. The theory allows us to relate different institutional features (commitment, specialization costs, monitoring, multiple principals) to delegation's observable properties.