Structural Dependence of the State on Capital
Structural Dependence of the State on Capital
复制标题
国家对资本的结构性依赖
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
1988
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
M. Wallerstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Przeworski;M. Wallerstein
马克思主义和新古典主义政治理论的一个核心主张是，在资本主义制度下，所有政府都必须尊重和保护那些拥有社会生产性财富的人的基本权利。这就是“国家对资本的结构性依赖”理论。使用形式模型，检验了该理论的内在逻辑和稳健性。我们的结论是，在静态意义上，这一理论是错误的：一旦一套适当的税收和转移到位，几乎任何在工薪阶层和资本所有者之间的消费分配都与持续的私人投资兼容。然而，在动态意义上，这个国家可能在结构上是依赖的。一旦政策到位，在不减少投资的情况下重新分配收入，确实会在预期但尚未实施的时期减少投资。
A central claim of both Marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society. This is the theory of “structural dependence of the state on capital.” Using a formal model, the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined. We conclude that in a static sense the theory is false: virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place. Yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense. Policies that, once in place, redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented.