Speech Acts, Criteria and Intentions
Speech Acts, Criteria and Intentions
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言语行为、标准和意图
DOI：
10.2478/v10016-010-0008-8
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jesús Navarro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jesús Navarro
言语行为、标准和意图什么使言语行为成为言语行为？它的充分必要条件是什么？本文认为，我们不能在奥斯汀的不当性理论中找到这些问题的答案，因为一些不当性发生在完全实施言语行为的过程中，而另一些不当性则阻止了话语被认为是一种言语行为。考虑到这一条件，我反对的想法，意图被认为是完成一个因果关系的行为表现的心理状态，应被视为言语行为的必要条件。因此，我想否认一种仅仅是“症状性的"意图解释，根据这种解释，我们只能对任何言语行为的有效发生作出容易出错的假设。我提出了一个替代的“critical”帐户的意图在言语行为理论中的作用，并分析了奥斯汀和塞尔的方法，在这个维特根斯坦的概念。无论我们是像奥斯汀那样认为言语行为“暗示”了心理状态，还是像塞尔那样认为言语行为“表达”了心理状态，只有当我们将话语视为意图的标准，而不是所谓的隐藏的心理原因的行为效果时，我们才能理解这一观点。
Speech Acts, Criteria and Intentions What makes a speech act a speech act? Which are its necessary and sufficient conditions? I claim in this paper that we cannot find an answer to those questions in Austin's doctrine of the infelicities, since some infelicities take place in fully committing speech acts, whereas others prevent the utterance from being considered as a speech act at all. With this qualification in mind, I argue against the idea that intentions—considered as mental states accomplishing a causal role in the performance of the act—should be considered among the necessary conditions of speech acts. I would thus like to deny a merely ‘symptomatic’ account of intentions, according to which we could never make anything but fallible hypotheses about the effective occurrence of any speech act. I propose an alternative ‘criterial’ account of the role of intentions in speech acts theory, and analyse Austin's and Searle's approaches in the light of this Wittgensteinian concept. Whether we consider, with Austin, that speech acts ‘imply’ mental states or, with Searle, that they ‘express’ them, we could only make sense of this idea if we considered utterances as criteria for intentions, and not as alleged behavioural effects of hidden mental causes.
哲学与语言
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
Shouwado
影响因子：
--
作者：
T.Okamura;Sugita Masaki
通讯作者：
Sugita Masaki