Can Code Polymorphism Limit Information Leakage?
Can Code Polymorphism Limit Information Leakage?
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_1
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发表时间：
2011-06
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通讯作者：
Antoine Amarilli;Sascha Müller;D. Naccache;D. Page;Pablo Rauzy;Michael Tunstall
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作者：
Antoine Amarilli;Sascha Müller;D. Naccache;D. Page;Pablo Rauzy;Michael Tunstall
除了通常的复杂性假设之外，密码学默默地假设信息可以在单个位置受到物理保护。不难想象，现实生活中的设备并不理想，信息可能会通过不同的物理侧通道泄漏。众所周知，信息泄漏是执行代码 F 及其输入 x 的函数。在这项工作中，我们探索使用多态代码作为抵抗侧通道攻击的方法。我们展示了过程语言和函数语言的实验结果。在每种情况下，我们都会在执行之前重写受保护的代码 codeFi。结果是程序 F0,F1,... 的谱系，这样对于所有输入 x 和所有索引 $i \neq j \Rightarrow F_i(x)=F_j(x)\mbox{~and~}F_i\neq F_j$。这被证明可以增强对侧信道攻击的抵抗力。
In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As one can easily imagine, real-life devices are not ideal and information may leak through different physical side-channels. It is a known fact that information leakage is a function of both the executed codeFand its inputx.In this work we explore the use of polymorphic code as a way of resisting side channel attacks. We present experimental results with procedural and functional languages. In each case we rewrite the protected code codeFibefore its execution. The outcome is a genealogy of programsF0,F1,… such that for all inputsxand for all indexes $i \neq j \Rightarrow F_i(x)=F_j(x)\mbox{~and~}F_i\neq F_j$. This is shown to increase resistance to side channel attacks.