Chip-to-Chip Authentication Method Based on SRAM PUF and Public Key Cryptography

Chip-to-Chip Authentication Method Based on SRAM PUF and Public Key Cryptography
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基于SRAM PUF和公钥密码技术的芯片到芯片认证方法

DOI:
10.1007/s41635-019-00080-y
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
L. Pileggi
L. Pileggi
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
I. Karageorgos;Mehmet Meric Isgenc;S. Pagliarini;L. Pileggi

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

在当今全球化的集成电路(IC)生态系统中,不受信任的代工厂经常被采购来构建关键系统,因为它们提供最先进的硅,具有最佳的性能。另一方面,源自可信制造的IC不能匹配相同的性能水平,因为可信制造通常在传统节点上可用。分芯片是一种双IC方法,它利用了不可信IC的性能,并将其与可信IC的性能相结合。在本文中,我们提供了一个芯片到芯片认证的框架,可以进一步改善分裂芯片系统,保护它免受攻击,是独特的分裂芯片。讨论了利用基于SRAM的PUF作为标识符和用于握手的公钥加密的硬件实现。提供了电路特性,其中可信IC以28 nm CMOS技术设计,而不可信IC以同样商用的16 nm CMOS技术设计。最重要的是,我们的解决方案不需要处理器来执行任何握手或加密任务,因此不易受到软件漏洞和漏洞的影响。
In today’s globalized integrated circuit (IC) ecosystem, untrusted foundries are often procured to build critical systems since they offer state-of-the-art silicon with the best performance available. On the other hand, ICs that originate from trusted fabrication cannot match the same performance level since trusted fabrication is often available on legacy nodes. Split-Chip is a dual-IC approach that leverages the performance of an untrusted IC and combines it with the guaranties of a trusted IC. In this paper, we provide a framework for chip-to-chip authentication that can further improve a Split-Chip system by protecting it from attacks that are unique to Split-Chip. A hardware implementation that utilizes an SRAM-based PUF as an identifier and public key cryptography for handshake is discussed. Circuit characteristics are provided, where the trusted IC is designed in a 28-nm CMOS technology and the untrusted IC is designed in an also commercial 16-nm CMOS technology. Most importantly, our solution does not require a processor for performing any of the handshake or cryptography tasks, thus being not susceptible to software vulnerabilities and exploits.