Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access
Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access
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DOI：
10.1145/1530748.1530751
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发表时间：
2009-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Juncheng Jia;Qian Zhang;Qin Zhang;M. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Juncheng Jia;Qian Zhang;Qin Zhang;M. Liu
频谱是一种重要而稀缺的资源，动态频谱接入可以显著提高频谱利用率。为了实现这一目标，重要的是激励主要许可证持有者开放其未充分利用的频谱进行共享。在本文中，我们提出了一个二级频谱市场，一个主要的许可证保持器持有人可以出售其未使用或未充分使用的频谱资源的形式，某些细粒度的频谱空间时间单位。二级无线服务提供商可以购买这样的合同来部署新的服务，增强他们现有的服务，或部署ad hoc服务，以满足快速人群的需求。在这个市场的背景下，我们研究如何使用拍卖机制来分配和定价频谱资源，使主许可证保持器的收入最大化。我们开始分类的频谱需求方面的一些替代拍卖格式。然后，我们研究了一个特定的拍卖格式，二级无线服务提供商有固定位置（细胞）的需求。我们提出了一个基于虚拟估价概念的最优拍卖。假设估价分布的知识，最优拍卖使用Vickrey-Clarke-格罗夫斯（VCG）机制，以最大化的预期收益，同时强制真实性。为了降低计算复杂度，我们进一步设计了一个多项式时间复杂度的真实次优拍卖。它使用单调分配和临界值支付来增强真实性。仿真结果表明，这种次优拍卖可以产生稳定的预期收益。
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to incentivize the primary license holders to open up their under-utilized spectrum for sharing. In this paper we present a secondary spectrum market where a primary license holder can sell access to its unused or under-used spectrum resources in the form of certain fine-grained spectrum-space-time unit. Secondary wireless service providers can purchase such contracts to deploy new service, enhance their existing service, or deploy ad hoc service to meet flash crowds demand. Within the context of this market, we investigate how to use auction mechanisms to allocate and price spectrum resources so that the primary license holder's revenue is maximized. We begin by classifying a number of alternative auction formats in terms of spectrum demand. We then study a specific auction format where secondary wireless service providers have demands for fixed locations (cells). We propose an optimal auction based on the concept of virtual valuation. Assuming the knowledge of valuation distributions, the optimal auction uses the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to maximize the expected revenue while enforcing truthfulness. To reduce the computational complexity, we further design a truthful suboptimal auction with polynomial time complexity. It uses a monotone allocation and critical value payment to enforce truthfulness. Simulation results show that this suboptimal auction can generate stable expected revenue.