Rivalry, normativity, and the collapse of logical pluralism
Rivalry, normativity, and the collapse of logical pluralism
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竞争、规范性和逻辑多元主义的崩溃
DOI：
10.1080/0020174x.2017.1327370
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Erik Stei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Erik Stei
抽象逻辑多元论是认为存在不止一个正确逻辑的观点。这一非常笼统的特征产生了一系列立场。我认为，并不是所有人都是稳定的。这篇论文的主要论点是受到被称为“崩溃问题”的考虑的启发，它针对JC·比尔和格雷格·雷斯特尔所倡导的最流行的逻辑多元化形式。我认为，有一个更普遍的论点，它挑战了满足以下三个条件的所有逻辑多元化的变体：(I)至少存在两个以不同结果关系为特征的正确逻辑系统，(Ii)正确逻辑之间存在某种竞争，以及(Iii)逻辑结果是规范的。我主张的假设相当于条件声明：如果一个头寸满足所有这些条件，那么这个头寸就是不稳定的，因为它会崩溃为相互竞争的头寸。
Abstract Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stable. The main argument in the paper is inspired by considerations known as the “collapse problem”, and it aims at the most popular form of logical pluralism advocated by JC Beall and Greg Restall. I argue that there is a more general argument available that challenges all variants of logical pluralism that meet the following three conditions: (i) that there are at least two correct logical systems characterized in terms of different consequence relations, (ii) that there is some sort of rivalry among the correct logics, and (iii) that logical consequence is normative. The hypothesis I argue for amounts to conditional claim: If a position satisfies all these conditions, then that position is unstable in the sense that it collapses into competing positions.