Incentivizing Relay Participation for Securing IoT Communication

Incentivizing Relay Participation for Securing IoT Communication
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DOI:
10.1109/infocom.2019.8737451
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发表时间:
2019-04
期刊:
IEEE INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Xiaonan Zhang;Pei Huang;Linke Guo;M. Sha
Xiaonan Zhang;Pei Huang;Linke Guo;M. Sha
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Xiaonan Zhang;Pei Huang;Linke Guo;M. Sha

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物联网(IoT)已经成为一种新的计算范式,有望提供一个完全连接的“智能”世界。然而,由于无线介质的开放性,物联网设备感测、收集和传输的信息很容易被对手拦截,这在大多数需要敏感数据的物联网应用中成为一个严重的问题。在实际应用中,协作通信方法可以有效地提高无线通信的安全水平,存在窃听者具有无限的计算能力。在本文中,我们应用放大转发(AF)协作通信,通过激励中继物联网设备来增加物联网系统的保密能力。具体而言,Stackelberg游戏旨在激励中继物联网设备的参与,以增强安全性。大量的实验结果表明,在未知和已知信道状态信息(CSI)模型下,该机制的可行性和安全性。
Internet of Things (IoT) has emerged as a new computing paradigm that promises to offer a fully connected “smart” world. However, due to the open nature of wireless medium, the information sensed, collected, and transmitted by IoT devices can be easily intercepted by adversaries, which becomes a serious concern in most IoT applications requiring sensitive data. In practice, cooperative communication approaches can effectively improve the security level for wireless communication under the presence of eavesdroppers with unbounded computational ability. In this paper, we apply the amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperative communication to increase the secrecy capacity of IoT systems by incentivizing relay IoT devices. Specifically, a Stackelberg game is designed to motivate the participation of the relay IoT devices for security enhancement. Extensive experimental results have demonstrated the feasibility and security of the proposed mechanism under both unknown and known channel state information (CSI) models.