Competition and Coordination in Two‐Tier Public Service Systems under Government Fiscal Policy
Competition and Coordination in Two‐Tier Public Service Systems under Government Fiscal Policy
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DOI：
10.1111/poms.12555
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发表时间：
2016-08
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Zhongsheng Hua;Wuhua Chen;Z. Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhongsheng Hua;Wuhua Chen;Z. Zhang
由于政府预算限制和市场快速增长，许多公共服务系统（如医疗保健）的特点是客户等待时间过长，这已成为一个严重的问题。这个问题可以通过允许私人公司进入这些市场来解决，这将为客户提供免费（政府）公共服务提供商（SP）和收费（或“收费”）私人服务提供商之间的选择。在这样的两层服务系统中，两种服务提供商通过服务质量和成本效率来区分。本研究聚焦于两层服务系统的竞争与协调问题，顾客对服务品质与延迟都很敏感。免费系统试图在有限的容量下最大化其预期的总客户效用，而收费系统试图最大化其利润。这两个目标都与公共服务的社会福利目标不一致。为了实现社会福利目标，政府通过预算、社会成员目标的权衡和税收补贴政策在协调双层服务体系方面发挥着至关重要的作用。利用混合双寡头博弈，建立了纳什均衡策略，并确定了两层服务系统存在的条件。我们采用了该模型产生的几个有趣且反直觉的管理见解，以表明通过客户选择和SP竞争可以更有效地提供公共服务。此外，我们表明，相对较低的税收补贴率几乎可以完美地协调两个sp，以实现两层服务体系的最大可能利益。
As a result of government budgetary limits and rapid market growth, many public service systems—such as health care—are characterized by extensive customer wait times that have become a serious problem. This problem might be solved by allowing private firms to enter these markets, which would provide customers with a choice between a free (governmental) public service provider (SP) and a fee‐charging (or “toll”) private SP. In such a two‐tier service system, the two SPs are differentiated by service quality and cost efficiency. This study focuses on the competition and coordination issues for two‐tier service systems with customers who are sensitive to both service quality and delay. The free system attempts to maximize its expected total customer utility with limited capacity, whereas the toll system attempts to maximize its profit. Neither goal is aligned with the social welfare goal of the public service. To achieve the social welfare goal, the government plays a crucial role in coordinating the two‐tier service system via the budget, the tradeoff of social members' goals, and tax‐subsidy policies. Using a mixed duopoly game, we establish Nash equilibrium strategies and identify the conditions for the existence of the two‐tier service system. We employ several interesting and counter‐intuitive managerial insights generated by the model to show that the public service can be delivered more efficiently via customer choice and SP competition. In addition, we show that a relatively low tax‐subsidy rate can almost perfectly coordinate the two SPs to achieve most of the maximum possible benefit of the two‐tier service system.