CREDIBILITY OF POLICIES VERSUS CREDIBILITY OF POLICY-MAKERS
CREDIBILITY OF POLICIES VERSUS CREDIBILITY OF POLICY-MAKERS
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DOI：
10.2307/2118420
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发表时间：
1994-08-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
MASSON, PR
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DRAZEN, A;MASSON, PR
政策可信度的标准模型，定义为对宣布的政策将被执行的预期，强调政策制定者的偏好以及强硬政策在表明强硬和提高可信度方面的作用。然而，一项政策是否得到执行也将反映经济状况——我们提出了一个模型，在这个模型中，政策制定者在经济景气时保持固定的平价，但在失业率过高时贬值。我们的主要结论是，如果失业率持续存在，那么在特定时期执行强硬政策可能会降低而不是提高随后时期不贬值承诺的可信度。我们在EMS利率上检验了这一含义，并为我们的假设找到了支持。
Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy- We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis.