Federal tax competition and the efficiency consequences for local taxation of revenue equalization
Federal tax competition and the efficiency consequences for local taxation of revenue equalization
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DOI：
10.1007/s10797-008-9094-8
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发表时间：
2010-02
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Christos Kotsogiannis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christos Kotsogiannis
最近的研究表明，均等化赠款制度可以抵消下级政府之间税收竞争造成的效率损失。然而，这些模型忽略了当联邦和下级政府在同一基础上征税时发生的纵向税收外部性。本文将均等化赠款纳入一个标准的资本税竞争模型中，在该模型中，管辖区之间存在横向税收外部性，各级政府之间存在纵向税收外部性。它表明，即使在纵向税收外部性的存在下，一个有效的水平，较低层次的政府税收可以实现一个标准的均衡赠款公式的修改版本。
Recent work has shown that a system of equalization grants can neutralize the efficiency loss caused by tax competition among lower-level governments. These models, however, ignore the vertical tax externalities that occur when the federal and lower-level governments levy taxes on the same base. This paper incorporates equalization grants into a standard capital tax competition model in which there are horizontal tax externalities between jurisdictions and vertical tax externalities between the levels of government. It is shown that, even in the presence of vertical tax externalities, an efficient level of lower-level government taxation can be achieved with a modifying version of a standard equalization grant formula.