Tight Consistency Bounds for Bitcoin
Tight Consistency Bounds for Bitcoin
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DOI：
10.1145/3372297.3423365
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发表时间：
2020-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Peter Gazi;A. Kiayias;A. Russell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Peter Gazi;A. Kiayias;A. Russell
我们建立了最佳的安全阈值的比特币协议的对抗哈希功率，诚实的哈希功率，和网络延迟。具体来说，我们证明了该协议是安全的，如果[ra < 1/Δ0 + 1/rh，，]其中rh是单位时间内诚实工作量证明成功的预期数量，ra是对抗成功的预期数量，并且没有消息延迟超过Δ0时间单位。在这种情况下，协议保证了一致性和活性与指数衰减的失败概率。在这个区域之外，简单的私有链攻击阻止共识。我们的分析立即适用于任何Nakamoto风格的工作量证明协议;在本文的完整版本中，我们还介绍了将其应用于权益证明设置所需的调整，在那里建立了类似的阈值。
We establish the optimal security threshold for the Bitcoin protocol in terms of adversarial hashing power, honest hashing power, and network delays. Specifically, we prove that the protocol is secure if [ra < 1/Δ0 + 1/rh,,] where rh is the expected number of honest proof-of-work successes in unit time, ra is the expected number of adversarial successes, and no message is delayed by more than Δ0 time units. In this regime, the protocol guarantees consistency and liveness with exponentially decaying failure probabilities. Outside this region, the simple private chain attack prevents consensus. Our analysis immediately applies to any Nakamoto-style proof-of-work protocol; in the full version of this paper we also present the adaptations needed to apply it in the proof-of-stake setting, establishing a similar threshold there.