Non-executive ownership and private loan pricing
Non-executive ownership and private loan pricing
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101638
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发表时间：
2020-10
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Jun Chen;T. D. King;Min-Ming Wen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jun Chen;T. D. King;Min-Ming Wen
本文研究了非执行员工所有权与公司贷款的条款和定价之间的联系。我们发现，一个标准差的员工持股增加与1.67%的贷款利差下降和一个限制性贷款契约。当我们使用公司内变异并使用基于人口统计特征的工具变量进行分析以解决内部控制问题时，员工持股对贷款利差的负面影响仍然显着。进一步的分析表明，员工持股可以通过改善公司治理、抑制管理层风险承担、减少信息不对称和提高员工保留率来影响贷款利差。相比之下，我们发现，员工持股通过股票期权与更大的贷款利差，也许是由于他们的凸回报结构。总的来说，我们的研究结果强调了员工所有权的水平和结构对公司贷款定价的重要性。
This paper examines the link between non-executive employee ownership and the terms and pricing of corporate loans. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in employee stock ownership is associated with 1.67% decrease in loan spreads and one fewer restrictive loan covenant. The negative effect of employee stock ownership on loan spreads remains significant when we use within-firm variation and perform an analysis with instrumental variables based on demographic characteristics to address the concerns of endogeneity. Further analysis reveals that employee stock ownership may affect loan spreads by improving corporate governance, curbing managerial risk-taking, reducing information asymmetry, and improving employee retention. In contrast, we find that employee ownership via stock options is associated with greater loan spreads, perhaps owing to their convex payoff structure. Overall, our results underscore the importance of the level and structure of employee ownership for pricing corporate loans.