Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships
Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00181.x
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发表时间：
2012-09
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Iossa;D. Martimort
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Iossa;D. Martimort
我们研究委托公共服务提供的代理成本，重点关注组织形式与项目实施中的不确定性之间的联系。我们考虑一个动态的多任务道德风险环境，其中努力和绩效之间的映射是事先不确定的，但在操作过程中可能会出现新的信息。我们的分析强调了将规划和实施捆绑在一起的成本和收益——就像在公私合作伙伴关系下一样——可以在各种情况下带来项目设计和运营成本，可能会导致信息不对称、道德风险和重新谈判。它还表明，只有在贷方有足够的专业知识来评估项目风险的情况下，依靠私人融资才能增强捆绑销售的效益。
We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementation--as under public--private partnerships--can bring in terms of project design and operational costs under various scenarios, possibly allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard and renegotiation. It also shows that relying on private finance enhances the benefits of bundling only if lenders have enough expertise to assess project risks.