Detecting Large-Scale Collusion in Procurement Auctions
Detecting Large-Scale Collusion in Procurement Auctions
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DOI：
10.1086/718913
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发表时间：
2014-05
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Keiichi Kawai;Jun Nakabayashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Keiichi Kawai;Jun Nakabayashi
我们使用一个新的数据集记录了日本建筑公司之间广泛串通的证据，该数据集涵盖了日本中央政府采购的大多数建筑项目。我们的数据集包含大约42,000次拍卖的信息，这些拍卖的获奖金额约为400亿美元。我们通过关注所有(初始)出价未能达到秘密保留价的拍卖中发生的重新出价来识别串通。我们确定了1000多家公司的行为与竞争行为不一致。这些投标者获得了大约15,000个项目，约占我们样本中项目总数的37%。
We document evidence of widespread collusion among construction firms in Japan using a novel data set covering most of the construction projects procured by the Japanese national government. Our data set contains information on about 42,000 auctions whose award amount sums to about $40 billion. We identify collusion by focusing on rebids that occur for auctions in which all (initial) bids fail to meet the secret reserve price. We identify more than 1,000 firms whose conduct is inconsistent with competitive behavior. These bidders were awarded about 15,000 projects, or about 37% of the total number of projects in our sample.