Cheating in the Workplace: An Experimental Study of the Impact of Bonuses and Productivity
Cheating in the Workplace: An Experimental Study of the Impact of Bonuses and Productivity
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2109698
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发表时间：
2012-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
David Gill;Victoria Prowse;Michael Vlassopoulos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David Gill;Victoria Prowse;Michael Vlassopoulos
我们使用一个在线的真实努力实验来研究奖金为基础的工资和工人的生产力如何与工作场所作弊相互作用。公司经常使用基于奖金的薪酬计划，如团体奖金和公司范围内的利润分享，这导致了工人工资的不确定性。将工人暴露在基于随机奖金的补偿方案中会使他们更容易作弊，但对他们的生产率没有影响。我们还发现，生产力更高的工人表现得更不诚实。这些结果与员工的欺骗行为是一致的，因为他们认为雇主的薪酬计划是公平的。
We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating. Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are paid. Exposing workers to a compensation scheme based on random bonuses makes them cheat more but has no effect on their productivity. We also find that more productive workers behave more dishonestly. These results are consistent with workers’ cheating behavior responding to the perceived fairness of their employer’s compensation scheme.