Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board&Apos;S Entry Decisions
Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board&Apos;S Entry Decisions
复制标题
公共垄断与经济效率：来自宾夕法尼亚州酒类管制委员会的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joel Waldfogel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Katja Seim;Joel Waldfogel
While private monopolists are generally assumed to maximize profits, the goals of public enterprises are less well known. Using the example of Pennsylvania's state liquor retailing monopoly, we use information on store location choices, prices, wholesale costs, and sales to uncover the goals implicit in its entry decisions. Does it seek to maximize profits or welfare? We estimate a spatial model of demand for liquor that allows us to calculate counterfactual configurations of stores that maximize profit and welfare. We find that welfare maximizing networks have roughly twice as many stores as would maximize profit. Moreover, the actual network is much more similar in size and configuration to the welfare maximizing configuration. An alternative to a state monopoly would be the common practice of regulated private entry. While such regimes can give rise to inefficient location decisions, little is known about the size of the resulting inefficiencies. Even for a given number of stores, a simple characterization of free entry with our model results in a store configuration that produces welfare losses of between 3 and 9% of revenue. This is a third to half of the overall loss from unregulated free entry.
价格对酒精消费和酒精相关问题的影响。
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
Alcohol research & health : the journal of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
影响因子：
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作者：
Chaloupka,FrankJ;Grossman,Michael;Saffer,Henry
通讯作者：
Saffer,Henry
影响因子：
3.5
作者：
MANNING, WG;BLUMBERG, L;MOULTON, LH
通讯作者：
MOULTON, LH