MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?
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DOI：
10.1162/rest_a_00518
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发表时间：
2015-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Cullen M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Aron-Dine A;Einav L;Finkelstein A;Cullen M
使用雇主提供的健康保险和医疗保险D部分的数据，我们调查医疗保健利用率是否响应于健康保险合同的非线性性质所产生的动态激励。我们利用了这样一个事实，即由于年度覆盖率通常在每年1月重置，因此在今年晚些时候加入计划的个人将面临相同的初始（“现货”）医疗保健价格，但预计年底（“未来”）价格更高。我们发现一个统计上显着的反应，最初的利用未来的价格，拒绝空，个人只对现货价格的反应。我们讨论了医疗保险中的道德风险分析的影响。
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial (“spot”) price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year (“future”) price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.