Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution
Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution
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随机污染的自我报告与调控政策设计
DOI：
10.1006/jeem.1993.1016
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
A. Malik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Malik
摘要 现有的环境法规经常要求企业向监管机构自我报告其合规状况。使用委托代理框架，我得出并比较了有或没有自我报告的激励兼容监管政策。我发现，当需要自我报告时，公司需要接受的审计次数较少，但受到的惩罚却较多。自我报告收益的迹象和大小取决于审计和制裁成本的相对规模、监管机构监控技术的准确性以及所需的减排努力水平。
Abstract Existing environmental regulations frequently require firms to self-report their compliance status to regulatory agencies. Using a principal-agent framework, I derive and compare incentive-compatible regulatory policies with and without self-reporting. I find the firm needs to be audited less often when self-reporting is required, but punished more often. The sign and magnitude of the gains from self-reporting depend on the relative size of audit and sanction costs, the accuracy of the regulator′s monitoring technology, and the desired level of abatement effort.