Representative evidence on lying costs
Representative evidence on lying costs
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.005
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发表时间：
2014-05-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Falk, Armin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Abeler, Johannes;Becker, Anke;Falk, Armin
经济学中的一个核心假设是，如果人们为了物质利益而误报他们的私人信息，那么他们就会误报。最近的几个模型偏离了这一假设，认为有些人不撒谎，或者至少没有最大限度地撒谎。这些模型涉及许多不同的潜在动机，包括内在说谎成本、利他主义、效率问题或有条件合作。要为这些模型提供一个经过验证的微观基础，关键是要了解不同潜在动机的相关性。我们衡量的程度说谎的成本之间的一个代表性的德国人口的样本打电话给他们在家里。在我们的设置中，参与者有明显的货币激励误报，误报无法检测，声誉问题可以忽略不计，利他主义，效率问题或有条件的合作不能发挥作用。然而，我们发现，总的报告行为是接近预期的真实分布表明，说谎成本是大而普遍。进一步的实验室实验表明，这一结果不是由通信模式驱动的。(C)2014作者由Elsevier B. V.发布。这是CC BY许可下的开放获取文章（http：//creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/）。
A central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit. Several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do not lie maximally. These models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs, altruism, efficiency concerns, or conditional cooperation. To provide an empirically-validated microfoundation for these models, it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential motives. We measure the extent of lying costs among a representative sample of the German population by calling them at home. In our setup, participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport, misreporting cannot be detected, reputational concerns are negligible and altruism, efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role. Yet, we find that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution suggesting that lying costs are large and widespread. Further lab experiments show that this result is not driven by the mode of communication. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).