Response by Cook to “Beyond Counting Climate Consensus”
Response by Cook to “Beyond Counting Climate Consensus”
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库克对“超越气候共识”的回应
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发表时间：
2017
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Cook
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作者：
J. Cook
皮尔斯等人。 （2017）为气候传播者提出了一个非此即彼的选择：通过量化关于人为造成的全球变暖的科学共识水平来传达共识，或者通过辩论气候变化减缓和适应政策选择来促进公众审议。这是错误的二分法。就人为造成的全球变暖建立专家共识是讨论缓解和适应政策的基石。相反，如果不能解决对共识的误解，就会导致干扰的持续存在，从而拖延实质性的政策讨论。共识问题的历史说明了强调专家共识的重要性，并强调了忽视传达气候变化科学共识的危险。 Naomi Oreskes 于 2004 年发表了第一项研究，量化了专家对人为造成的全球变暖的共识程度 (2004)。随后进行了其他研究（Anderegg、Prall、Harold 和 Schneider，2010；Cook 等人，2013；Doran 和 Zimmerman，2009），最终形成了一份综合报告（Cook 等人，2016）。然而，从 20 世纪 90 年代开始，在这些研究之前，旨在质疑共识的错误信息运动以及随后的运动都是对这些研究结果的直接回应。 1991 年，西方燃料协会开展了一项耗资 50 万美元的活动，旨在“将全球变暖重新定位为理论（而非事实）”（Oreskes，2010）。 Elsasser 和 Dunlap（2013）分析了 2007 年至 2010 年发表的关于气候变化的保守派观点文章，发现最常见的气候神话是“没有科学共识”。根据行业监管组织 DeSmogBlog 的社交媒体分析，2016 年六个月期间，分享次数最多的与气候变化相关的文章标题为“数万名科学家宣称气候变化是一场骗局”（Readfearn，2016）。为什么气候政策的反对者对科学共识表示怀疑？政治战略家 Frank Luntz 在 20 世纪 90 年代末起草的一份备忘录中阐述了这一基本原理，他建议共和党人将主要重点放在气候变化缺乏科学确定性上（Mooney，2006）。这是基于市场研究发现，对专家共识提出质疑会降低公众对缓解政策的支持。换句话说，关于共识的错误信息是不采取行动的杠杆。皮尔斯等人认为强调共识“会分散人们对重要实际挑战的注意力”，与此相反，共识沟通的目的是消除旨在减少公众对气候政策支持的干扰。伦茨的见解得到了随后的社会科学研究的证实。许多相关研究和随机实验重复了这样的发现，即感知到的科学共识是一种“门户信念”，影响着一系列关于气候变化的其他信念，包括政策支持（Brewer & McKnight，2017；Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz，2011；Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan，2012；McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao，2013；范德林登、Leiserowitz、Feinberg 和 Maibach，2015）。研究还开始将门户信念模型应用于其他科学背景，例如疫苗（van der Linden、Clarke 和 Maibach，2015）和转基因食品（Dixon，2016）。
Pearce et al. (2017) present an either/or choice for climate communicators: communicating consensus by quantifying the level of scientific agreement on human-caused global warming or facilitating public deliberation by debating climate change mitigation and adaptation policy options. This is a false dichotomy. Establishing expert consensus on human-caused global warming is a stepping stone leading to discussion of mitigation and adaptation policies. Conversely, failure to address misconceptions about consensus enables the persistence of distractions that can delay substantive policy discussion. The history of the consensus issue illustrates the importance of highlighting expert agreement, and underscores the dangers of neglecting to communicate the scientific consensus on climate change. Naomi Oreskes published the first study in 2004 quantifying the level of expert agreement on human-caused global warming (2004). This was followed by other studies (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009) culminating in a synthesis report (Cook et al., 2016). However, beginning in the 1990s, misinformation campaigns designed to cast doubt on consensus preceded these studies and subsequent campaigns have been in direct response to their findings. In 1991, the Western Fuel Association conducted a half-million-dollar campaign designed to “reposition global warming as theory (not fact)” (Oreskes, 2010). Elsasser and Dunlap (2013) analysed conservative opinion pieces on climate change published from 2007 to 2010, finding the most common climate myth was “there is no scientific consensus.” According to a social media analysis by the industry watchdog group DeSmogBlog, during a six-month period in 2016 the most shared climate change-related article was titled “Tens of Thousands of Scientists Declare Climate Change A Hoax” (Readfearn, 2016). Why do opponents of climate policy cast doubt on scientific consensus? The rationale was articulated in a memo drafted in the late 1990s by political strategist Frank Luntz, who advised Republicans to place primary emphasis on a lack of scientific certainty about climate change (Mooney, 2006). This was based on market research which found that casting doubt on expert consensus reduced public support for mitigation policies. In other words, misinformation about the consensus was a lever for inaction. Contrary to Pearce et al.’s assertion that highlighting consensus “distracts attention away from important practical challenges,” the purpose of consensus communication is to remove a distraction designed to reduce public support for climate policy. Luntz’s insights have been borne out by subsequent social science research. A number of correlational studies and randomized experiments have replicated the finding that perceived scientific consensus is a “gateway belief,” influencing a range of other beliefs about climate change including policy support (Brewer & McKnight, 2017; Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2012; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013; van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015). Studies have also begun to apply the gateway belief model to other scientific contexts such as vaccines (van der Linden, Clarke, & Maibach, 2015) and genetically modified food (Dixon, 2016).