The inverse fallacy: An account of deviations from Bayes’s theorem and the additivity principle
The inverse fallacy: An account of deviations from Bayes’s theorem and the additivity principle
复制标题
逆谬误：对贝叶斯定理和可加性原理的偏差的解释
作者：
G. Villejoubert;D. Mandel
在判断后验概率时，人们经常用逆条件概率来回答，这种倾向被称为逆谬误。参与者（N=45）被给予一系列概率问题，需要估计p（HvbD）和p（HvbD，HvbD）。研究结果表明，参与者的估计从贝叶斯计算和加性原理的偏差可以预测从这些相关的规范性基准的逆概率的相应偏差。方法和理论的影响之间的区别逆谬误和基本率忽视和推广的研究条件概率的可加性进行了讨论。
In judging posterior probabilities, people often answer with the inverse conditional probability—a tendency named theinverse fallacy. Participants (N=45) were given a series of probability problems that entailed estimating bothp(HvbD) andp(≈,HvbD). The findings revealed that deviations of participants’ estimates from Bayesian calculations and from the additivity principle could be predicted by the corresponding deviations of the inverse probabilities from these relevant normative benchmarks. Methodological and theoretical implications of the distinction between inverse fallacy and base-rate neglect and the generalization of the study of additivity to conditional probabilities are discussed.
影响因子：
5.4
作者：
Rottenstreich, Y;Tversky, A
通讯作者：
Tversky, A