30,000 Minimum Wages: The Economic Effects of Collective Bargaining Extensions
30,000 Minimum Wages: The Economic Effects of Collective Bargaining Extensions
复制标题
30,000 最低工资：集体谈判延期的经济影响
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Pedro S. Martins
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pedro S. Martins
一些国家将集体谈判协议扩大到整个部门，从而对非签约工人和雇主具有约束力。这些延长可能解决协调问题，但也可能扭曲竞争，因为规定了部门特定的最低工资和其他不适合许多公司的工作条件。在本文中，我们分析了这种扩展的影响沿着几个利润率绘制公司层面的月度数据，葡萄牙，一个国家的扩展一直普遍，直到最近。根据延期的分散时间，我们发现，在延期发布后的四个月内，相关部门的正式就业和工资账单平均下降2%，小企业的降幅更大，为25%。这些结果是由减少招聘和增加公司关闭驱动的。另一方面，不受劳动法或延期限制的非正式工作趋于增加。我们的调查结果是强大的几个检查，包括伪造的基础上，已宣布但未实施的扩展练习。JEL代码：J52，K31，J23
Several countries extend collective bargaining agreements to entire sectors, therefore binding non-subscriber workers and employers. These extensions may address coordination issues but may also distort competition by imposing sector-specifc minimum wages and other work conditions that are not appropriate for many firms. In this paper, we analyse the impact of such extensions along several margins drawing on firm-level monthly data for Portugal, a country where extensions have been widespread until recently. Drawing on the scattered timing of the extensions, we find that both formal employment and wage bills in the relevant sector fall, on average, by 2% - and by 25% more across small firms - over the four months after an extension is issued. These results are driven by both reduced hirings and increased firm closures. On the other hand, informal work, not subject to labour law or extensions, tends to increase. Our findings are robust to several checks, including a falsification exercise based on extensions that were announced but not implemented. JEL codes: J52, K31, J23