Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India
Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India
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DOI：
10.1086/659655
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发表时间：
2011-02-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Sundararaman, Venkatesh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Muralidharan, Karthik;Sundararaman, Venkatesh
我们目前的结果，从一个教师绩效工资计划的随机评估，在印度安得拉邦的政府经营的农村小学的一个大的代表性样本实施。在2年的计划结束时，激励学校的学生在数学和语言测试中的成绩分别比对照学校的学生好0.27和0.17个标准差。我们没有发现该计划有任何不良后果的证据。该计划具有很高的成本效益，奖励学校的表现明显优于其他随机选择的学校，这些学校接受了类似价值的额外教育投入。
We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher performance pay program implemented across a large representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. At the end of 2 years of the program, students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.27 and 0.17 standard deviations in math and language tests, respectively. We find no evidence of any adverse consequences of the program. The program was highly cost effective, and incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value.