Liquid Democracy: An Algorithmic Perspective
Liquid Democracy: An Algorithmic Perspective
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DOI：
10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11468
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发表时间：
2018-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anson Kahng;Simon Mackenzie;Ariel D. Procaccia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Anson Kahng;Simon Mackenzie;Ariel D. Procaccia
我们研究流动民主，这是一种集体决策范式，允许选民通过算法镜头传递他们的选票。在我们的模型中，有两种选择，一种是正确的，一种是错误的，我们感兴趣的是大多数人的意见是正确的概率。我们的主要问题是，是否存在保证优于直接投票的授权机制，因为它总是至少有可能做出正确的决定，有时更有可能做出正确的决定。尽管我们假设选民只能将他们的选票委托给消息更灵通的选民，但我们表明，只将每个选民的当地邻居作为输入（并且可以说，捕捉了流动民主的精神）的地方委托机制不能提供上述保证。相比之下，我们设计了一种非地方授权机制，在对选民的温和假设下，该机制确实优于直接投票。
We study liquid democracy, a collective decision making paradigm that allows voters to transitively delegate their votes, through an algorithmic lens. In our model, there are two alternatives, one correct and one incorrect, and we are interested in the probability that the majority opinion is correct. Our main question is whether there exist delegation mechanisms that are guaranteed to outperform direct voting, in the sense of being always at least as likely, and sometimes more likely, to make a correct decision. Even though we assume that voters can only delegate their votes to better-informed voters, we show that local delegation mechanisms, which only take the local neighborhood of each voter as input (and, arguably, capture the spirit of liquid democracy), cannot provide the foregoing guarantee. By contrast, we design a non-local delegation mechanism that does provably outperform direct voting under mild assumptions about voters.