A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
复制标题
理性可接受性悖论的新解决方案
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
I. Douven
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
I. Douven
《彩票悖论》和《序言悖论》都涉及到这样一个命题，即高概率对于理性的可接受性是足够的。这些悖论的标准解决方案否认理性的可接受性是演绎封闭的。这种解决办法有许多不利的后果。本文认为，解决悖论的一个更好的办法是用一个更严格的命题来取代高概率足以使理性可接受的命题。这避免了标准解决方案的不良后果。新的解决方案将受到一个看似明显的反对意见的辩护。1理性可接受性的悖论2标准解决方案3悖论的新解决方案4基本假设5新解决方案辩护6结论7附录
The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox both involve the thesis that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The standard solution to these paradoxes denies that rational acceptability is deductively closed. This solution has a number of untoward consequences. The present paper suggests that a better solution to the paradoxes is to replace the thesis that high probability suffices for rational acceptability with a somewhat stricter thesis. This avoids the untoward consequences of the standard solution. The new solution will be defended against a seemingly obvious objection. 1 The paradoxes of rational acceptability 2 The standard solution 3 A new solution to the paradoxes 4 Basic assumptions 5 The new solution defended 6 Conclusion 7 Appendix