Effects of "Anti-Competitive" Mergers in R&D Intensive Industries
Effects of "Anti-Competitive" Mergers in R&D Intensive Industries
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发表时间：
1999
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Cardon;D. Sasaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Cardon;D. Sasaki
同一行业内竞争企业合并的效果是双重的。它增加了集中度，这对福利有负面影响，除非合并能大幅降低生产成本。然而，如果产品是差异化的，则会产生另一种效应：在产品上市之前，理性预见的企业会选择研发策略，这将推迟营销阶段的价格竞争。在存在排他性专利权的情况下，单独拥有的公司更有可能“集群”（即开发相同的产品），每个公司都试图先发制人，以垄断市场，而不是共同控制。因此，企业之间在研发阶段的合并可能会增加福利。研究表明，这两种影响之间的优势关系在研发成本和跨期偏好中都是非单调的，这决定了股权结构的福利最优性。
The effect of merger between competing firms in the same industry is twofold. It increases concentration, which has a negative effect on welfare unless the merger substantially lowers production costs. If products are differentiated, however, there is another effect: before the product is marketed, rationally foresighted firms will choose R&D strategies which will defer price competition in the marketing stage. In the presence of exclusive patent rights, the firms are more likely to "cluster" (i.e. develop the same product) when owned separately, each firm attempting to pre-empt its competitors so as to monopolize the market, as opposed to when controlled jointly. Therefore mergers among firms at the R&D stage are potentially welfare-enhancing. We show that the dominance relation between these two effects, which determines the welfare-optimality of the shareholding structure, is non-monotone in R&D costs as well as in intertemporal preferences.