Direct versus indirect environmental regulation in a partially privatized mixed duopoly
Direct versus indirect environmental regulation in a partially privatized mixed duopoly
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DOI：
10.1007/bf03353980
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发表时间：
2009-06
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Tohru Naito;Hikaru Ogawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tohru Naito;Hikaru Ogawa
本文研究了在环境损害与生产相关联的混合双寡头市场中的最优环境规制问题。具体而言，部分私有化的最优政策选择，环境损害和社会福利的影响进行了检查下三个制度：无管制，直接管制的排放，并通过庇古税间接调节。不同规制体制下的共同结果是，最优环境规制水平关键取决于私有化程度，其关系不是单调的。此外，研究结果表明，虽然私有化的结果在不同的政策选择，环境破坏和社会福利的影响，在三个不同的制度下，它是最兼容的环境质量的改善。
This article examines the optimal environmental regulation in a mixed duopolistic market wherein environmental damage is associated with production. Specifically, the effects of partial privatization on optimal policy choices, environmental damage, and social welfare are examined under three regimes: no regulation, direct regulation on emission, and the indirect regulation via Pigouvian tax. The common result under the different regimes of regulation is that the optimal level of environmental regulation critically depends on the degree of privatization, and its relationship is not monotonous. Furthermore, results show that while privatization results in different impacts on policy choices, environmental damage, and social welfare under the three different regimes, it is mostly compatible with an improvement in environmental quality.