An Integrated Game-Theory Based Model for Trans-Boundary water Resources Management in North China: a Case Study in the Guanting Reservoir Basin (GRB), Beijing
An Integrated Game-Theory Based Model for Trans-Boundary water Resources Management in North China: a Case Study in the Guanting Reservoir Basin (GRB), Beijing
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DOI：
10.1142/s021819400800374x
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发表时间：
2008-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zhifeng Yang;Yong Zeng;Y. Cai;Q. Tan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhifeng Yang;Yong Zeng;Y. Cai;Q. Tan
水是我们日常生活和社会发展的基本资源。目前，我国北方地区用水需求持续增长，自然灾害频发，水资源处于紧张状态。水质恶化是经济发展、工业扩张和农业增长的副作用，这进一步加剧了这一问题。这些问题相互关联，导致各种水资源冲突。为了解决这种冲突，一个两人博弈论为基础的模型，在跨边界区域的流域水资源管理。该模型在中国这一地区的水资源争夺的河流流域进行了测试。通过开发的模型，可以为流域内的水资源管理和污染控制产生潜在的政策选择。因此，可以通过同一河流流域内不同级别的管辖区之间在水量和水质问题上的竞争与合作来制定合作和/或竞争机制。然后，在优化模型与仿真模型相结合的基础上，利用纳什解求解上下游企业之间的竞争与合作情景。然后将所开发的模型和求解过程应用于解决北京和河北省之间的水冲突，这两个省分别位于官厅水库流域（GRB）的上游和下游，代表了两个主要的利益相关者在争夺水量和水质。非合作和合作的两个玩家的游戏场景的情况下，开发调查和比较这些方案的潜在经济效益。结果表明，该模型可以有效和灵活地用于解决同一流域上下游利益相关者之间的水资源冲突。研究结果也可用于帮助制定这些司法管辖区内的经济补偿机制。
Water is a fundamental resource in our daily lives and for social development. Currently, water resources are under stressed conditions in north China due to the ongoing growth of demand for water and the frequent occurrences of natural disasters in this area. This problem is further intensified by the deterioration of water quality, which is a side effect of economic development, industrial expansion, and agricultural growth. These problems interconnect with each other, leading to a variety of conflicts over water resources. To resolve such conflicts, a two-person game-theory based model is developed for water resource management in the trans-boundary regions of a river basin. The model is tested on a river basin within this area of China in which water resources are contested. Through the developed model, potential policy alternatives can be generated for water resource management and pollution control within the context of a river basin. Cooperative and/or competitive mechanisms can thus be formulated through competition and cooperation over issues of water quantity and quality among different levels of jurisdictions in the same river basin. Then, Nash Solution is used to solve scenarios of competition and cooperation between the upstream and downstream based on the integration of optimization and simulation models. The developed model and the solution process is then applied to resolve water conflicts between Beijing and Hebei province, which are in the upstream and downstream of the Guanting Reservoir Basin (GRB), respectively, representing two major stakeholders in the contest over water quantity and quality. Non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios for the two-player game scenarios are developed to investigate and compare potential economic benefits of these scenarios. Results indicate that the developed model can be effectively and flexibly employed to resolve water conflicts between upstream and downstream stakeholders in the same river basin. The results can also be used to help formulate economic compensation mechanisms within these jurisdictions.