Legal Competition, Political Process and Irreversible Investment Decisions
Legal Competition, Political Process and Irreversible Investment Decisions
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合法竞争、政治程序和不可逆转的投资决策
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Demougin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Deffains;D. Demougin
我们比较了竞争的影响，劳动法的设计，在一个环境的特点是不可逆转的投资，在人力和物质资本。我们比较了自给自足与两国的情况下，假设资本是移动的和劳动力的im移动的。我们区分两种情况。在第一种情况下，政治制度是免费的捕获，而在第二，我们研究的情况下，劳动捕获的制度设计问题。我们发现，在前一种情况下，法律的竞争降低福利，而在后者，它提高了整体的结果。
We compare the effects of competition for the design of labor laws in an environment characterized by irreversible investments in human and physical capital. We compare autarky with two-country cases, assuming that capital is mobile and labor immobile. We distinguish two cases. In the first, the political system is free from capture, while in the second, we examine the case where labor captures the institutional design problem. We find that in the former case legal competition reduces welfare while in the latter it improves the overall outcome.