Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China
Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China
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DOI：
10.1017/s0022109010000190
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发表时间：
2010-03
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
M. Firth;Chen Lin;H. Zou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Firth;Chen Lin;H. Zou
摘要我国股权分置改革是由非流通股股东向流通股股东提出补偿方案，以换取其股份的上市权。我们发现，国有股权（非流通股的主要所有者）对最终补偿比例有积极的影响。相反，共同基金所有权（流通股的主要机构所有者）对薪酬比率有负面影响，特别是在国有企业。证据与我们的预测一致，即国有股东有动机迅速完成改革，并向共同基金施加政治压力，迫使它们不战而降地接受条款。
Abstract The recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares) has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight.